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5 
TELEVISING THE COURT:  
A CATEGORY MISTAKE 
Christina B. Whitman* † 
The idea of televising Supreme Court oral arguments is undeniably ap-
pealing. Consequently, it is not surprising that reporters and politicians have 
been pressuring the Court to take this step. The other branches have been 
media-friendly for years, and Supreme Court arguments are already open to 
the public. Why should those of us who neither reside in Washington, D.C. 
nor have the time to attend Court proceedings be asked to depend on report-
ers for descriptions of the event? Even lower courts permit cameras. There is 
an understandable hunger for anything that will help us understand these 
nine individuals who have so much power—who can even choose a Presi-
dent, or at least hasten his anointment. Are the Justices refusing to reveal 
themselves because they prefer mystery, because they do not want the public 
to realize that the Court is a human institution after all? Whatever the Jus-
tices’ motives, televising the Court’s arguments is a terrible idea. It is both 
misleading and unnecessary. Misleading because it would only randomly 
tell us something useful about the Court, and unnecessary because the Court 
is already more open than the other branches. 
Oral arguments and announcements of decisions are the only moments 
of public performance in the work of the Court, but they are more perform-
ance than work. Arguments come in the middle of the Justices’ 
consideration of a case—after considerable reading, discussion, and 
thought, but before more of the same. Individual Justices use arguments dif-
ferently. Some Justices simply do not work out their thoughts orally. The 
Justice with whom I am most familiar, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., preferred 
to communicate through memoranda—even with his clerks. He was an ex-
tremely successful litigator, but also a Southern gentleman. Showing off his 
intelligence, much less asking a snide question or making a cutting remark, 
was just not his style. Conversely, other Justices enjoy the give-and-take 
with each other and with the advocates for the sake of the encounter alone. 
Their dialogue may or may not focus on what really matters to their deci-
sion in a case. They might just be pouncing on a weak argument for the pure 
pleasure of the kill. Either way, every comment is already overanalyzed for 
a hint as to what is on the Justices’ minds. 
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Oral arguments already receive too much of the wrong kind of attention 
because Court watchers enjoy the game of predicting outcomes, and argu-
ments provide an occasion to justify a story or a comment on a blog. But 
this attention gives arguments a misleading importance. It is common to say 
that a lawyer cannot win a case by her oral argument, but that she can lose 
her case that way. This is as it should be. Ideally, we want effective advo-
cates for both sides, but we should hope that the Justices can rise above a 
poor argument and reach a result that reflects judgment and justice despite 
the shortcomings of its advocate. Most arguments are lost not by embarrass-
ing advocacy, but rather because a lawyer is not always able to avoid 
admitting under direct questioning to a weakness in his case that was con-
cealed in his brief. 
I enjoy reading the argument transcripts, which are now available almost 
immediately, and I use them in my classes. But they are a treat rather than a 
meal. On television and radio, the availability of transcripts already promotes 
emphasis on the kinds of insights and ripostes that can be conveyed in sound-
bites. There are Justices whose performances lend themselves to soundbites, 
who have a quick and provocative wit, and these Justices inevitably attract the 
most attention. Although these qualities are not inconsistent with greatness, 
they are not the qualities that make a Justice great. Despite the fun, focusing 
on these qualities distracts us from less flashy indications of excellence. 
So, the televising of oral arguments is misleading. It is also unnecessary. 
The Court has always been an open institution on the matters that count. 
The judiciary, at least at the appellate level, has always been required to ex-
pose the reasons underlying its actions more than either of the other 
branches of government—through the discipline of writing published opin-
ions. That is the process through which judges are publicly accountable, and 
it has no counterpart in the political branches. It is not easy to spot dishonest 
reasoning or evaluate quality of judgment as captured in opinions, but it is 
possible. It requires effort, and it is admittedly undemocratic in that it also 
requires expertise. But it is exactly the process of struggling with writing 
that gives the judiciary its unique character and disciplines the tendency to 
rely on first impressions or subjective reactions. The voices of individual 
Justices can be traced through their separate opinions and even found in 
their collegial opinions for a group. But the individual is not obscured just to 
create an insiders’ guessing game. The collegial process is the whole point. 
A Justice who speaks for the greatest number of her colleagues speaks with 
the most authority. 
Is it naive to take the collegial character of the Court and its written 
opinions so seriously? Perhaps Justices delegate all this effort to their law 
clerks and are not really subject to the discipline of forming the written 
work. Perhaps they are only really engaged while on the bench, if there. To 
the extent that has happened, it is a betrayal of their obligation as Justices, a 
rejection of the key justification for judicial review—and certainly not 
something to be accepted or encouraged by overemphasizing oral argument. 
The standard arguments against televising the Court are true, too. Media 
attention might already be encouraging individual Justices to play to an  
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audience. It would be unfortunate and inappropriate if the most attractive, or 
even the fastest wit, were to become the public face of the Court. 
Politicians are accustomed to performing in the spotlight. They may not 
appreciate how invasive the camera can seem to people who have not lived 
their lives this way. Justice Powell took media access seriously, but he saw it 
as a duty rather than a pleasure. Even more exposure to public scrutiny 
might have made his years on the Court deeply uncomfortable. For people 
like Powell, for whom public service is an obligation and public perform-
ance a necessary evil, becoming a media celebrity might be too costly. Yet 
we need people like Justice Powell in part because they understand the costs 
of public scrutiny and the value of privacy.  
A narrow view of accountability, one that reduces it to public observa-
tion, has already turned too much governmental decision-making away from 
substance. Media attention already focuses on the sharpest tongue on the 
bench. Let us not give verbal skill more importance than it deserves, lest it 
change the character of our least democratic but most open branch. 
